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PREFACE 
In the January 1985 i s s u e of the American J o u r n a l of 
S o c i o l o g y we p u b l i s h e d a p a p e r , "Do S o c i o l o g i c a l T h e o r i e s Grow?" , 
c oncerned p r i m a r i l y with the r o l e s we b e l i e v e t h e o r e t i c a l 
r e s e a r c h programs p lay in the growth o f t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge in 
s o c i o l o g y . This paper has g e n e r a t e d a good d e a l of comment. The 
J o u r n a l , i n f a c t , has a c c e p t e d two c r i t i q u e s o f "Do S o c i o l o g i c a l 
T h e o r i e s Grow?" , and our r e s p o n s e to them. Th i s exchange w i l l 
appear in a f o r t h c o m i n g i s s u e o f the J o u r n a l ( p r o b a b l y Ju ly 
1986) . 
The exchange f o c u s e s on such b a s i c q u e s t i o n s as the 
i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s o f t h e o r y , m e t a t h e o r v , and o b s e r v a t i o n s , and the 
adequacy o f program a n a l y s i s i n e x p l o i t i n g the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
t r a d i t i o n o f s o c i o l o g y . D i s c u s s i o n o f these i s s u e s i s o f 
i n t e r e s t to a i l s o c i o l o g i s t s . We wish to encourage more such 
d i s c u s s i o n . 
Because of the importance of t h e s e m a t t e r s we are i s s u i n g 
our r e s p o n s e to t h e s e c r i t i q u e s as a t e c h n i c a l r e p o r t . Th is 
r e s p o n s e is somewhat l o n g e r than t h a t p u b l i s h e d in AJS. We 
i n v i t e your comments, bo th p r i v a t e l y and as p a r t i c i p a n t s in a 
p u b l i c d e b a t e o f i n t e r e s t t o s o c i o l o g i s t s g e n e r a l l y . 
David G. Wagner Joseph Berger 
S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y of New York S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y 
A l b a n y , New York S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a 
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INTRODUCTION 
Analysis of the ways in which theoretical knowledge in sociology grows or 
develops is a large and complex task. "Do Sociological Theories Grow?" was an 
attempt to contribute to the performance of that task. In that art i c le we 
distinguished three leve ls of theoretical ac t iv i ty : orienting strategies, 
unit theories , and theoretical research programs. We argued that theoretical 
growth is best analyzed at the level of programs, in part because orienting 
strategies are comparatively stable and because the analysis of growth at the 
level of unit theories focuses primarily on questions of empirical adequacy. 
We then showed that an analysis at the level of programs yields at least f ive 
d i f ferent patterns of theoretical growth: elaboration, pro l i ferat ion , 
competition, variation, and integration. The f i r s t three of these patterns, 
we claimed, generate entire programs of a c t i v i ty , while the latter twa usually 
occur only at advanced stages of programs based on the other three patterns. 
Some challenges to our analysis have been raised. A few of these 
challenges r e f l e c t basic di f ferences in our approaches to sociology. Many 
more involve misunderstandings based on ambiguities or di f ferences in emphasis 
in our original a r t i c l e . Wfe appreciate this opportunity to c l a r i f y and expand 
our discussion of some issues that have arisen from our analysis. 
Our comments are organized around several major issues: (1) the way in 
which the structures of theoretical research programs are determined, (2) the 
role that such programs play in the analysis of theoretical growth, (3) the 
interrelatedness of theory, metatheory and observations, and (4) the adequacy 
of program analysis in exploiting the intellectual tradition of sociology. 
Before considering these substantive issues, howsver, we find it 
necessary to make two comments: one on the nature of some of the statements 
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in Maines and Molseed's remarks and the second on their use of technical 
terms. 
First, we note that their remarks are punctuated throughout with 
statements imputing motives and intentions we are supposed to have, 
attributing attitudes toward others ws are supposed to hold, and inferring 
character traits ws presumably exhibit in our work. Thus, for example, we are 
said to behave "arrogantly"; we are told that the "obsessive discoverer's 
complex" applies to our work with i t s accompanying "disdain for prior work not 
of their clique thinly vei led" ; and we are said to display the quality of 
"r igidity" in our work. Our response to these statements is to cal l attention 
to their repeated occurrence (as if repetition would give them reality) and to 
invite the reader to read our paper. 
Second, we observe that Maines and Molseed make frequent use of 
technical-sounding terms in analyzing our work. They claim that it is 
"inconsistent," that it is "imprecise," that our definitions are "vague and 
specious," that we "engage in ontological debate," and that our account of 
theory growth is "tautological"—these among many other things. Some of the 
time, the meanings of their technical terms are unclear. Some of the time, 
they apply these terms without reasoned argument, or with an argument whose 
val idity ws believe to be in question. But almost al l of the time, these 
technical-sounding judgments are delivered in an apodictic manner. We shall 
not stop to analyze Maines and Nblseed's usage of each of these "technical" 
terms. Later in our discussion, however, we shall br ie f ly consider two 
exanples of their technical-sounding judgments, one involving the idea of 
"tautology" and the other the idea of "ontology." 
Now, on to substantive matters. 
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DETERMINING THE STRICTURE OF A PROGRAM 
In our ar t i c l e i l lustrated the analysis of linear programs ( i . e . ones 
in vMch the primary mode of development is theory elaboration) with two 
examples from the bargainirig l i terature . Both programs—conflict spiral and 
deterrence—use key ideas from Ihibaut and Kelley (1959) regarding 
interdependence in social relationships. Both focus s p e c i f i c a l l y on the role 
of threats in bargaining. However, the two programs develop somewhat 
d i f ferent accounts of just what that role i s . 
In the c o n f l i c t spiral program Deutsch and Krauss (1960) elaborate 
Ihibaut and Kelley*s more general analysis by specifying a "face-saving" 
mechanism governing the use of threats. Any threat by A causes a loss of face 
for B, which prompts B to issue a counterthreat to A; the result is a spiral 
of c o n f l i c t . Shomer, Davis, and Kelley (1966) then elaborate Eeutsch and 
Krauss by distinguishing threat from actual harm or punishment; only the 
l a t t e r , they argue, always generates the c o n f l i c t sp ira l . By contrast, in the 
deterrence program Itorai and Tedeschi (1969) elaborate Ihibaut and Kelley by 
specifying a "subjective expected ut i l i ty " mechanism governing the use of 
threats. Each credible threat by A increases the u t i l i t y of compliance for 8; 
as a resul t , B is deterred from issuing a counterthreat to A. Ttedeschi et a l . 
(1972) elaborate Horai and Tedeschi by enumerating a set of structural and 
situational conditions (e .g . attractiveness, prestige) that a f f e c t the 
subjective expected u t i l i t y of compliance; the higher the u t i l i t y , the greater 
the deterrent e f f e c t of compliance. Finally, Bacharach and Lawler (1981) 
integrate both c o n f l i c t spiral and deterrence principles in a single 
formulation v*hich spec i f i es tne conditions under which each e f f e c t occurs. 
Basically, their argument is that deterrence occurs when the stakes in the 
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bargaining are relatively low; as the stakes increase, the likelihood that 
threat will prompt counterthreat increases, thus inducing a con f l i c t spiral . 
Maines and Molseed have challenged our analysis of these programs. Their 
f i r s t criticism is that the deterrence principles do not constitute a theory. 
This claim is based on a misunderstanding of what may be considered a theory. 
Theories are minimally composed of a set of concepts and a set of theoretical 
assertions and principles that involve these concepts. Often much of the 
structure that these concepts and assertions comprise is l e f t implicit : 
concepts are vaguely defined or l e f t undefined altogether; assertions are 
vaguely stated or ambiguously related to each other. Nevertheless, implicit 
theories are s t i l l theories. They may simply be regarded as theories which 
are not fu l ly explicated. Such is the case with both deterrence and conf l i c t 
spiral . In much of the relevant literature large parts of the theoretical 
structure are l e f t implicit . It is only in Bacharach and Lawler's work that a 
relatively clear and complete explication of both theories becomes available.2 
Maines and Molseed also c r i t i c i ze our characterization of relations 
between the theories in the conf l i c t spiral and deterrence programs. Our 
analysis is in error, they argue, because some of the relations we specify are 
not reflected in citation analyses or statements of authors' intentions. This 
challenge too is based on a misunderstanding, in tnis case of the nature of 
the theoretical relations that characterize a program. All of the relations 
we consider—elaboration, proli feration, competition, variation and 
integration—are abstract and analytical. They have to do with the structural 
features of theories. Our specif ication of di f ferent relational types is 
based on similarities in such features as the conceptual and propositional 
apparatus of the theories, the problem focus or explanatory domain of the 
theories, and the predictions made about the data and observations relevant to 
the theories. For example, if one theory T(l) uses principles very similar to 
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those of another theory T{2) in addressing a similar sociological problem, but 
makes predictions which are more comprehensive, precise, rigorous, or 
empirically accurate, then T(2) is an elaborant of T ( l ) . 
Thus, to determine vrtiat theoretical relation ( i f any) exists between two 
speci f ic theories, one must f i r s t identify the structural features we have 
outlined and then evaluate how similar each of those features are. Other 
kinds of information, such as citations or the expressed intentions of 
authors, may provide clues to the relations between theories, but they are not 
the basis upon which the relations between theories are speci f ied. 
Consider f i r s t citation analyses. Such analyses do not, of course, 
directly reveal theoretical structure. Furthermore, particular citations may 
be present or absent for many reasons other than theoretical relatedness. 
Expressly stated intentions of the author are subject to many of the same 
limitations. Authors are not always exp l i c i t , consistent, or sure of their 
intentions in constructing a theory. Even when the author's intentions are 
c lear , they may not accurately re f lec t vtfiat he or she has accomplished or how 
others will use the theory; abstract, analytical linkages between theories may 
be independent of the intent of the theorist. Since determinations of 
theoretical relatedness are based on the analysis of structural features of 
theories, c itations and expressed intentions are at best only suggestive. 
In the bargaining programs theoretical relations are based on several 
structural features. First , there is a similarity in problem focus. In both 
programs theories include as at least part of their explanatory domains the 
role of threats in determining the outcome of bargaining relationships. 
Second, there is a similarity in conceptual and propositional apparatus. In 
both programs theories incorporate the key notion of "interdependence of 
behavioral outcomes" from Thibaut and Kelley (1959). These features are 
central to al l the linkages we specify in the two bargaining programs. They 
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are the most important (though certainly not the only) bases for our claim 
that Thibaut and Kelley (1959) is related to Deutsch and Krauss (I960) and to 
Horai and Tedeschi (1969). 
Other structural features determine what kind of relationship exists 
between these theories. Deutsch and Krauss (1960) and Hsrai and Tedeschi 
(1969) each introduce propositional mechanisms (face-saving and subjective 
expected ut i l i ty respectively) that permit more speci f ic predictions about the 
consequences of threats in bargaining situations than is possible using 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959). This greater determinacy or precision of 
predictions (along with the similarities in problem focus and conceptual 
apparatus) makes both theories elaborants of Ihibaut and Kelley.^ 
Maines and Molseed's misunderstandings lead them astray more than once. 
Perhaps the most important instance is in tneir challenge to our claim that 
Bacharach and Lawler (1981) integrate Tedeschi's wark with conf l i c t spiral 
theory. Maines and Molseed have misrepresented some of our statements here.^ 
The more important issue, however, is that structural analysis shows that the 
work of Tsdeschi and his associates does fa l l within the scope of the 
Bacharach and Lawler theory (and is therefore part of the integration 
Bacharach and Lawler perform). 
First , the conceptual apparatus of both theories is similar. For 
example, the key explanatory mechanism in Tedeschi's theory is subjective 
expected u t i l i ty . Bacharach and Lawler use that idea to generate one of their 
core assumptions and to derive four core propositions from that assumption. 
Clearly, part of Tedeschi's theoretical apparatus has been incorporated in 
Bacharach and Lawler's theory. Second, the set of conditions with which 
Tedeschi's theory is concerned constitute a narrower and simpler subset of the 
conditions with vtfiich Bacharach and Lawler's theory is concerned. 
Speci f ical ly , Tedeschi's theory focuses on bargaining situations in which only 
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one party has the capability of threatening or punishing the other. Bacharach 
and Lawler sought to expand that concern to deal with multiple party 
capabil i t ies . Third, using the same theoretical mechanism, they saw that the 
behavior exhibited in these more complex situations d i f f e r s signif icantly from 
behavior in the simpler situation. Thus, in broadening the scope of the 
theory to deal with more complex situations they were (unsurprisingly) 
required to generate dif ferent predictions. I f , however, Bacharach and Lawler 
decided at some point to deal with the less complex situation, they could 
easily derive Tedeschi's predictions simply by excluding the second party's 
capabil it ies from consideration.^ 
Ihus, most of Maines and Molseed's challenge is based on erroneous 
assumptions about our analysis. They misunderstand i ts structural character 
and they ignore or misrepresent evidence which is consistent with i t . 
THEORY RELATIONS AND THEORY GROWTH 
Questions have also been raised about the general adequacy of our 
analytic framework in accounting for theory growth. Maines and Molseed, for 
example, charge that our "version" of the "notion" of theoretical research 
programs is meaningful only in terms of our use of cases to i l lustrate i t s 
appl icabi l i ty , and that, because we apply that framework to scxne of our own 
work, our account of theoretical growth in that work is "tautological ." 
What sense ( i f any) the label "tautological" has in this context is not 
c lear . It is just possible that Maines and Molseed do not understand the 
logic of our analysis. That analysis consists of two parts. First, we 
explicate, in .terms of abstract and general c r i ter ia , what we believe to be 
the major types of relations that obtain between theories. We use these 
relations to describe the structure of major types of research programs: the 
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linear program, the branching program, and the competing program. The second 
part of our analysis involves claims that the actual relations that obtain 
between the particular theories we consider (including some that we have 
developed) satisfy our abstract cr i ter ia for dif ferent types of theory growth. 
CUr analysis may be challenged on at least two grounds. First, our 
explication of di f ferent relations between theories and the dif ferent ways in 
which theories grow might be challenged by identifying structural relations 
between theories ws have not considered or by providing alternative 
explications of the relations between theories we have considered. One could 
certainly present a reasonable argument on these counts, and we would be 
interested in seeing what alternative explications are put forth. Second, our 
analysis might be challenged by showing that, given our criteria for dif ferent 
types of theory relations, the actual relations that exist between the 
theories we analyze (including some we have developed) fa i l to satisfy these 
c r i t e r ia . 
Maines and Molseed do not challenge our explication of the dif ferent 
types of theory relations. Nor do they even attempt to show that the 
relations that exist between some of the theories we have developed fa i l to 
sat is fy the relevant cr i ter ia . It may be that Maines and Molseed believe our 
account of growth in our own theories is "tautological" because, say, 
increasing the generality and deductive power of these theories were goals in 
developing them (goals which of course have to be realized). If that is the 
case, Maines and Molseed either misunderstand the two-part nature of our 
analysis or are using the term "tautology" (which i s , after a l l , a standard 
term in logic) in an inappropriate manner. 
Seicfrnan's criticisms are more spec i f i c ; he believes we have excluded much 
theoretical growth that is central in the historical development of the 
discipline and included other growth that is either "decidedly of a low-level" 
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or not in fact growth at a l l . Unfortunately, Seicknan never explicates the 
criteria he is using to evaluate theoretical growth. Although he does present 
examples of cases he believes we have inadequately analyzed, he says nothing 
about how or why our analysis f a i l s . At one leve l , then, there is very l i t t l e 
in Seidman's comments for us to respond to. Nevertheless, some c lar i f i cat ion 
is in order. 
First, we do not contend that theoretical development is excluded at the 
metatheoretical leve l . We believe there are several ways in which 
metatheoretical growth can occur. One of the most important ways is through 
the theories and programs a strategy spawns. Strategies change and develop in 
large part, we suggest, because they generate smaller, narrower, more focused 
theoretical entit ies which are more successful than their counterparts at this 
more limited level . After a l l , that is what strategies are about. They te l l 
us how to build theories. It makes sense, therefore, to judge change and 
development in a strategy in terms of the success of i ts products. 
In our view, then, each kind of theoretical activity plays a dif ferent 
role in the development of theoretical knowledge. Consider, for example, 
Davis and Moore's functional theory of s trat i f i cat ion . Seidman suggests that 
this theory is more than just a set of empirically testable propositions; it 
is also a conceptual framework that gives coherence and meaning. While we 
basically agree here, we would state the point in the opposite manner: 
Whatever else is involved in Davis and Moore's theory, there is also a set of 
interrelated propositions, at least one of which can be subjected to empirical 
test .^ It is the comparative success (or lack of success) in the Davis and 
Moore of developing these propositions that is central in the 
evaluation of the functionalist strategy within which the Davis and Moore 
theory is formulated."^ 
9 
Seidman believes we have included too much in our scheme. We do not 
agree. Our choice of relational types is based in part on an assumption that 
other cr iteria besides empirical evaluation are involved in accounting for 
theoretical growth. Thus, for example, we regard proliferation as a type of 
theoretical growth because it opens up new explanatory domains. Proliferation 
increases the breadth of a program in that it can render accounts of di f ferent 
kinds of phenomena using the same family of concepts and assertions. Of 
course, empirical evaluation is important, as in any theoretical move. 
However, expansion of the range of application of a program's core ideas is 
equally important. 
We regard variation as a type of growth because it refines our knowledge 
of phenomena already within the range of application of a program. When a 
theory provides a basic and general account of some social phenomenon, any of 
a number of dif ferent kinds of spec i f i c explanatory mechanisms may be 
involved. Variation is enormously important in enabling the theorist to 
explore the implications of these di f ferent explanatory mechanisms; it allows 
the theorist to make close comparisons of subtle differences in thinking about 
the phenomenon to be explained. Just as proliferation increases the breadth 
of a program, variation increases i t s depth. 
Competition represents growth because it highlights aspects of a 
phenomenon not dealt with in the original theory. It increases our 
appreciation of the complexity of the phenomenon to be explained. Further, 
because our understanding is more complete, competition often focuses debate 
and helps to establish explanatory boundaries between theories (based on the 
aspects of the phenomenon dealt with by each theory) 
Seidman apparently accepts our characterization of elaboration as a type 
of theoretical growth. Ihis is not surprising, since elaboration is the 
pattern most widely understood and accepted by sociologists . Che of the major 
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points of our analysis, however, was to show that elaboration is not the only 
form of theoretical growth. 
Seme of our examples of elaboration are cr i t ic ized by Seidman as less 
than compelling. In particular, he challenges our claim that Dahrendorf 
constitutes an elaborant of Marx. We believe our characterization is the most 
reasonable one. Dahrendorf increases the precision of Marx's theory in moving 
from a dichotomous to a continuous conception of class interest. Hs increases 
the scope of Marx's theory with his incorporation of multiple bases for class 
division (not just the economic basis) . Both of these clearly constitute 
elaborations of Marx's argunent. 
Although Seidman's analysis is very br i e f , he seems to see Dahrendorf as 
either a variant or a competitor of Marx ("Dahrendorf's theory . . . i s an 
alternative to Marx's n o t i o n . . . . " ) . While we remain convinced that our 
characterization is the most reasonable one, we believe the case is 
suf f i c ient ly ambiguous that we would be interested in more detailed arguments 
for a di f ferent characterization. It is interesting that, even if we are 
wrong in our characterization of the relation between Dahrendorf and Marx, our 
typology yields plausible alternatives that are consistent with our c r i t i c ' s 
character ization. ^  
Finally, Seidman also seems to accept our characterization of integration 
as a type of theoretical growth. He apparently has missed the argument, 
however, that integration is part of a system of relations. The form that 
integration takes depends direct ly on the type of relation that exists between 
the integrated theories: variation, proli feration, or competition. Thus, to 
fu l ly understand the nature of di f ferent types of integration (which is one of 
the important consequences of our analysis), one must also understand the 
nature of variation, prol i feration, and competition as types of growth—the 
very relations Seidman questions. 
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THEORY, METATHEORY, AND OBSERVATIONS 
Our c r i t i c s invoke what they seem to believe are well-established 
postpositivist arguments in challenging our analysis. Even "testabi l i ty" as a 
criterion for assessing theory and theory growth is brought into question, 
presumably (according to Maines and Molseed) because there is debate among 
sociologists on i ts "relative importance," because "theory constructs i t s 
evidence" and because testabi l i ty is "problematic." Furthermore, our c r i t i c s 
appear to argue that in our analysis we are espousing some form of traditional 
positivism. These issues are of importance to sociologists (over and above 
this exchange) and merit some discussion. 
Note f i r s t tnat there are many forms of postpositivism. Fbr example, the 
positions of Hanson (1969), Feyerabend (1962), Kuhn (1970) (whose 
Weitanschaungen views of science and theory are, according to Suppe, 1977, 
already "on the wane,"), Lakatos (1970), Tbulmin (1972) and Shapere 
(1977)—postpositivists a l l—di f fer considerably. Fbstposivitism is not all 
of one c loth. In addition, the postpositivist statements cited by Seidman are 
neither universally accepted arguments nor established truths. There exists a 
body of c r i t i ca l literature concerned with explicating these arguments ( i . e . 
what do they really mean?), evaluating them, and in some cases challenging 
them (see Scheff ler, 1967, Achinstein, 1968, and Suppe, 1973). 
We regard our views of theory and science as postpositivist . At the same 
time, however, we reject the extreme relativism and subjectivism associated 
with certain postpositivist positions. The most coherent way to respond to 
our c r i t i c s is to present our postpositivist views on the issues that have 
been direct ly and indirectly raised by than. (For related discussions of 
these matters, see Wagner, 1984, and Zelditch, 1985.) 
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Theory, data and testabi l i ty . It is obvious that theory and data are 
related. Theory can be involved in determining what data is relevant, for 
what social situations the data is to be co l lected, what the data means, and, 
in conjunction with auxiliary assumptions, what the observational contexts for 
collecting data are. These dif ferent relations between theory and data, 
however, are quite complex; they depend on such things as how well developed 
the theory is (e .g . primitive or sophisticated), what the nature of the 
observational situation used by the researcher is (e .g . relatively 
unconstrained or highly control led) , and \*hat the theorist 's research focus is 
(e .g . the development of the theory or i t s application to a particular social 
situation) . 
At present we are far from having a deep understanding of these matters. 
We do not believe, however, that our understanding is particularly illuminated 
by such general statanents as "observation is theorv-laden" or "theory 
constructs i t s evidence." Such statements t e l l us l i t t l e about the complex 
relations that dif ferent types of theory may have to dif ferent types of 
observations and data. 
Further, these statanents can easily be construed to say more than 
intended. Theory does not determine the outcome of data. Theory does not 
determine, say, that a particular pattern of numerical values, expected to 
support a speci f ic prediction based on the theory, wil l in fact occur or be 
observed. If theory had this relation to data, there would be no need for 
observation. The theoretical enterprise would be complete with the 
formulation of the theory and the derivation of i t s implications. At sane 
stage, then, some one or more predictions of a viable theory is expected to 
confront data, data whose outcome is not dictated by the theory. It is in 
this sense that testabi l i ty is a criterion for assessing any sc ient i f i c 
theory. What the researcher does (e .g . the "relative importance" he or she 
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attaches to the outcome of any speci f ic test of a theory, particularly when 
the observations are anomalous) is a separate issue from the argument that 
testabi l i ty is a criterion for sc ient i f i c theory. !0 
Theory and anomalous data. Anomalous data ( i . e . data that does not 
accord with the predictions of a speci f ic theory) presents problems to which 
the theorist can respond with any of several theoretical moves. Che can 
question the design, execution and observational techniques involved in the 
relevant study. Che can introduce ad hoc hypotheses.11 One can l ive with the 
anomalous data without making any changes in the theory.1 2 One can make 
refinements, changes and modifications in the theory (e .g . eliminate a 
simplifying assumption, modify an existing concept or assertion, or add a new 
concept or principle to the formulation). The action chosen depends not only 
on the relation of the anomalous data to the theory, but also on the relation 
of the theory to other theories: Does there exist or can one construct a 
theoretical variant that will resolve the problems raised by the anomalous 
data? Does there exist or can one develop a theoretical integration that will 
account for the anomalous data? 
These are the theory-to-theory relations we explicate in our analytical 
scheme. Such a scheme should help us understand what theoretical moves the 
theorist can make, given anomalous data. Theory change may not be the f i r s t 
move the theorist undertakes; theory change may also be undertaken in the 
absence of any need to deal with data and observations (e .g . as when some 
concept or principle is changed to simplify the theory) . This does not mean 
that the theorist is unresponsive to data and observations. In fact , the 
postpositivist emphasis on what wb think of as "theories in progress" has made 
us aware of the many different ways in which data and observations a f fect the 
development of theory. This perspective has made us particularly sensitive, 
for example, to the importance of "early successes" ( i . e . corroborative 
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observational outcomes) in promoting theory development in a particular 
direction, to the importance of observations and data that are relevant to a 
theory but are not yet within i t s explanatory domain in developing new 
extensions of the theory, and, of course, to the importance of anomalous data 
as a basis for modifying and refining theory. Thus, "testabil i ty" is seen to 
play, not a less important role in theory development, but a more complex and 
varied role than that delineated in di f ferent versions of traditional 
positivism. 
In our view, to understand the rationality of the theorist 's particular 
response to observations and data, we must understand the structure of 
theoretical research programs ( i . e . the ways in which unit theories are 
connected to each other through such relations as proli feration, elaboration 
and variation). It is within this context that theoretical moves are made and 
growth occurs. 
Metatheory and _theory. Our c r i t i c s take sharp exception to our 
separating unit theories from metatheory. Ihey argue that theory is 
"embedded" in metatheory, that theory "articulates" metatheory, that values 
and faith "construct" theory.13 In fact , as we suggested earl ier , we believe 
that metatheoretical elements play a crucial role in the construction of unit 
theories. Broad-based (and at times metaphorical) conceptions about the 
nature of the social actor, conceptual schemes and franeworks, and theoretical 
directives (anong other elements) guide the theorist in constructing theories. 
At the same time, we argue that such metatheoretical elements, which orient 
the theorist in the construction of the theory, should be distinguished from 
the product of that construction—the theory proper. To make clear our 
thinking on this matter, we br ie f ly describe in terms of an example from our 
own work what we believe to be the relation of particular types of 
metatheoretical elements to unit theories. 
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As sociologists interested in social interaction, we hold some very broad 
and general conceptions about the nature of the social actor. Anong other 
notions these include the idea that the social interactant is an information 
processing actor. Also, in any particular situation of action, the actor can 
be confronted with di f ferent types of information that may be of significance 
to him or her. Further, we believe that the way the actor processes di f ferent 
types of information is crucial in determining the way he or she behaves in a 
given social situation. Ch the basis of these very broad and general 
conceptions, in conjunction perhaps with other metatheoretical notions and 
codified empirical information that is relevant to the particular domain of 
our concern (e .g . status, just i ce , social control ) , we can pose certain 
theoretical q u e s t i o n s . ^ what kind of information becomes salient to actors 
in a given type of situation? How do actors organize this salient 
information? How is the organized information translated into behavior? 
Under what conditions does the actor 's behavior maintain or erode the 
structure of organized information in the situation? In answering these 
questions for a particular domain we formulate concepts and theoretical 
assertions and principles. The speci f ic set of concepts and theoretical 
principles, as well as the assertions that are implied by these concepts and 
principles, constitutes our unit theory. 
What is the relation between our broad-based conceptions about the nature 
of social actors and our unit theory? First, the broad-based conceptions, in 
conjunction with other elements, orient us in constructing a particular type 
of cognitive and behavioral theory. They are, however, distinct from that 
theory. For within these conceptions we can construct a large number of 
di f ferent unit theories for a given domain, say status, that are in accord 
with these same conceptions. We can also construct within the same 
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broad-based conceptions dif ferent theories for di f ferent interpersonal 
processes. 
In comparison to the unit theories that are formulated within them, these 
broad-based conceptions tend to be relatively stable. Although they have 
undergone some change and they have become more clearly articulated over time, 
there has been considerably less change in these ideas than in the unit 
theoretical products that have been produced in accord with them. 
Furthermore, these conceptions (and other such metatheoretical elements) are 
evaluated indirectly and in terms of cr i ter ia different from those used to 
evaluate unit theories. In the final analysis they are evaluated in terms of 
their u t i l i ty as framework ideas, orienting principles, and directives in 
producing dif ferent types of unit theories. It is the unit theories, however, 
that are evaluated in terms of such criteria as empirical adequacy, 
generality, or explanatory power relative to other available unit theories. 
In our original artic le we did not undertake the task of developing a 
refined analysis of the relation of the metatheoretical elements that are 
involved in orienting strategies to unit theories. Such an analysis would 
require (1) distinguishing the dif ferent types of elements in orienting 
strategies (e .g . values, broad-based conceptions about social actors and the 
social order, theoretical directives which are either substantive or 
methodological, and conceptual frameworks), (2) describing the dif ferent types 
of relations between these elements (since ve doubt that they can be ordered 
on a single dimension), and (3) describing the relations between these types 
of elements and init theories. 
These are issues that will require study and analysis, lb fu l ly 
understand these issues, it will be necessary for sociologists to study and 
analyze dif ferent examples and cases of theory construction as it actually 
17 
occurs in d i f ferent substantive a r e a s . T h e aphoristic statements of our 
c r i t i c s , however, do not constitute such analysis. At best such statements 
obfuscate the existing dist inct ions between unit theories and metatheories. 
At worst they suggest that we cannot distinguish further between unit theories 
and the metatheoretical elements of orienting strategies. They suggest also 
that such terms as "articulates" or "embedded" in fact t e l l us al l there is to 
know as to how these elements are related to each other. We think that 
soc io log is ts can do considerably better than that. 
GLOBAL THEORIES AND THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITION OF SOCIOLOGY 
Finally, our c r i t i c s accuse us of narrowiess, of (in Seicinan's terms) 
" intel lectual emasculation" of the d i sc ip l ine . This is apparently because our 
c r i t i c s believe that our approach (again in Seicinan's terms) "excludes from 
consideration those global theories or overarching paradigms which are at the 
center of the structure and dynamics of sociology." 
We have no desire to exclude "global" theories from our sociological 
concerns. However, we do not believe it is appropriate to assume that 
"global" refers to a single kind of theoretical ent ity . 
Insofar as "global" refers to broad theoretical schools or tradit ions, we 
believe they involve a mixture of d i f f erent types of theoretical elements. 
Thus, we do not think in terms of a single symbolic interactionist theory but 
of theories within the symbolic interactionist tradition (e .g . Schef f ' s 
labelling theory of mental i l lness ) . Similarly, we do not think in terms of a 
single functionalist theory but o f , say, Davis and Moore's theory of 
s t rat i f i ca t ion as an element of the functionalist tradition. We do not 
believe it is f ru i t fu l to treat these broad theoretical schools as if they 
represented unitary theoretical formulations. 
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Insofar as "global" refers to some broad and perhaps vaguely formulated 
theory, we are interested in capturing the ideas, insights and principles that 
are involved in such formulations. Vfe think this can be best accomplished by 
making the concepts in these formulations expl i c i t and by articulating the 
theoretical principles they contain. Evaluation, refinement and theoretical 
development are thereby enhanced. (See TUrner, 1982, and Stinchcombe, 1963, 
for instances of this kind of enterprise.) 
Finally, insofar as "global" refers to the metatheoretical elements that 
are involved in theory building, we are concerned writh understanding the 
di f ferent types of elements that are involved in orienting strategies and how 
they a f f ec t our theoretical formulations (as we believe they do). Our 
objective is not to deny the operation of metatheoretical elements but to 
recognize their di f ferent forms and to understand their roles.1® 
We are not interested in eliminating the intellectual tradition in 
sociology but, on the contrary, in profiting by it and using i t ! 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Edward J. Lawler, Barry 
Markovsky, Henry Walker, Murray Webster, Jr . , and Morris Zelditch, Jr. to our 
consideration of the issues discussed in this paper. 
2. In support of their claim, Maines and Molseed c i te Bacharach and Lawler's 
(1981:117-118) statement that "one could even argue that, at present, there is 
no theory of deterrence." This quote is taken out of context. The relevant 
paragraphs show that Bacharach and Lawler see both deterrence and conf l i c t 
spiral as implicit theories, only partial ly explicated in prior l iterature. 
What they are saying at base is that a reader will not find the core 
proposition they state presented neatly somewhere in prior work. All that 
exists are fragments they are synthesizing. Nevertheless, coherent 
theoretical ideas are present that at least implicitly comprise a theory. 
(This interpretation is also supported by recent statements in Lawler, 
1985a,b.) 
3. Maines and Molseed are very selective in their review of the relevant 
l iterature. They ignore in an obvious manner information from citations that 
is consistent with our structural analysis. Fbr example, although Deutsch and 
Krauss (1960) do not c i te Thibaut and Kelley (1959), a summary of their work 
published two years later (Deutsch and Krauss, 1962) does. So too does 
Deutsch's 1973 book The Resolution of Conf l ict . Clearly, Deutsch and Krauss 
were aware of and made some use of Thibaut and Kelley's work (although, of 
course, one must use information other than citations to determine what the 
nature of that usage was). The same is true with respect to the work of 
Tedeschi and his associates. While the Horai and Tedeschi (1969) paper does 
not c i te Thibaut and Kelley, later work does. In fact, Tedeschi's 1973 book 
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Confl ict , Power _and Games (with Schlenker and Bonoma) has at least ten 
citations to Thibaut and Kelley. 
4. We indicate that Tedeschi and his associates have developed an account of 
part of the deterrence process. We state that Bacharach and lawler integrate 
deterrence theory (including much of the Tedeschi work) with conf l i c t spiral 
theory. In other words, we claim that Ttedeschi's work contributed to the 
integration, not that it is the only (or even the single most important) 
deterrence element in that integration. 
5. Maines and Molseed base their challenge here primarily on a quote from 
Bacharach and Lawler vrf-iich states that Tedeschi's work is outside the scope of 
their theory. Maines and Molseed have, in fact , misrepresented Lawler*s 
position on this matter. Lawler believes it is useful to distinguish the 
scope of Tedeschi's theory from the focus of his research. The Tedeschi 
theory does not expl i c i t ly state i ts scope and presumably could be used to 
deal with bilateral threat as well as unilateral threat. However, almost ai l 
of the Tedeschi " l ine of research" deals exclusively with unilateral threat. 
It is Tedeschi's l ine of research, more directly than the range of problems to 
which his theory is applicable, that Lawler sees as outside the scope of the 
Bacharach and Lawler theory. See Lawler, 1985b. 
6. Although a discussion of this issue would take us far afield from our 
immediate concerns, ve want to make it clear that we do not accept the idea 
that each of the propositions or principles in a theory must be directly 
testable. 
7. Of course, the evaluation of a strategy depends on the success of many 
dif ferent programs of theory, not just one. Progress in the exchange 
strategy, for example, depends on progress in the conf l i c t spiral program, the 
deterrence program, the equity program, and many, many others. 
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8. Seidman argues that variation and competition are best understood as 
instances of Kuhnian preparadigmatic c o n f l i c t . We do rot accept Kuhn's sharp 
distinction between paradigmatic and preparadigmatic status. We believe that 
multiple paradigms often exist even in mature science, Note that, although 
The Structure of Sc ient i f i c Revolutions is clearly a path-breaking work, 
Kuhn's depiction of the growth of sc ient i f i c knowledge has been subject to a 
great deal of c r i t i c ian . See, for example, the papers in Lakatos and Musgrave 
(1970). 
9. Of course, this probably would not satisfy Seicfcian, since he does not see 
either of the other possible characterizations as representing patterns of 
growth. 
10. Although his views are a mixture of di f ferent postpositivist positions, 
Kuhn does argue for testabi l i ty as a criterion for assessing the growth of a 
s c i ent i f i c theory. He argues that, if we compared an early theory with a 
relevant later theory, we could design a l i s t of cr iteria that "would enable 
the uncommitted observer to distinguish the early from the more recent theory 
time after time." This l i s t would include: "accuracy of predictions, 
particularly quantitative predictions, the balance between esoteric and 
everyday subject matter, the number of dif ferent problems solved" and also 
"such values as simplicity, scope, and compatibility with other spec ial i t ies . " 
See Kuhn (1970:206). 
11. There are, of course, l imits to the use of the strategy of ad _hoc 
hypotheses, limits which depend on the relation between the relevant theory 
and the anomalous data. With Popper, one wonders about the structure and 
status of the set of ad hoc hypotheses that would be necessary, given Newton's 
dynamics and theory of gravitation, to account for observations such as "the 
orbit of some planet is approximately rectangular" or "the ve loc i t ies of some 
planets decrease (rather than increase) when approaching their perihelion." 
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For a relevant and interesting exchange between Lakatos and Fbpper on this 
issue, see Fbpper (1974). 
12. lb l ive with anomalous data or observations does not mean that these 
observations have been forgotten or expunged and that the status of the theory 
is unchanged. Such anomalous data can continue to be salient to the theorist, 
and may even come to play a key role in the development and corroboration of a 
new theoretical formulation. See Pais' (1982) description of the role that 
accounting for the precession of Mercury's perihelion played in the 
development of re lat ivity theory. 
13. Msines and Molseed attempt to demonstrate the inseparability of theory 
from metatheory with an il lustration from our own work. In particular, they 
characterize a debate on the relative merits of status characteristics theory 
and a "styles of behavior" theory by Lee and Ofshe as an "instance of an 
ontological debate" at the level of theory (see Lee and Ofshe, 1981; and 
Berger and Zelditch, 1983). The basic facts of this case are straightforward. 
Berger and Zelditch o f f e r a methodological cr i t i c ian of an experiment carried 
out by Lee and Ofshe. Among many other c r i t i c i sns is the observation that one 
stimulus manipulation that Lee and Ofshe associate with styles of behavior, 
the degree of formality of dress, could easily be associated with the status 
variable they used, differences in occupational status. (Is this the 
ontological move?) Berger and Zelditch then present an alternative 
theoretical formulation to that given by Lee and Ofshe. This alternative 
leads to predictions that d i f f er from those of Lee and Ofshe and which are 
subject to experimental test . (See Ridgeway et a i . , 1985, for further 
information on the Berger and Zelditch argument; and TUziak and Moore, 1984, 
for recent experimental findings bearing on this debate.) 
"Chtology," as it is commonly understood, deals with questions of "the 
order and structure of reality in the broadest possible sense . . . " (Angeles, 
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1981; see this reference also for related def in i t ions) . We do not believe 
this term is applicable to the debate we have described. That debate consists 
of (1) a methodological c r i t i c i sn of an experiment, (2) an alternative 
theoretical formulation, and (3) predictions differing from those of Lee and 
Ofshe that can be subjected to experimental test . Maines and Molseed are 
either using an idiosyncratic definition of ontology vdnich makes it applicable 
to an unlimited set of considerations or they have failed to understand the 
nature of this debate. 
14. Metatheory-to-theory and theory-to-data relations are but one side of the 
story. Data and observations, which can be organized and conceptualized as 
abstract empirical generalizations, can play a crucial role in defining 
theoretical problems and in constructing theoretical formulations that 
constitute solutions to these problems. While such generalizations are not, 
of course, formally induced, they are constructed from factual bases of 
information consisting of observations and data. 
15. Such study will probably show that the relation between metatheory and 
unit theories is not unidirectional. Nat only do metatheoretical elements 
influence the construction of unit theories, but metatheoretical elements 
(e .g . conceptual frames, problem solving strategies) also are developed from 
the theorist 's experiences in constructing such theories. See Berger, Wagner, 
and Zelditch (1985). 
16. We have never claimed that attention to or understanding of the c lassics 
is wasted e f f o r t . It is perhaps by now not surprising that Maines and 
Molseed's quote to that e f f e c t is taken out of context. In fact , the source 
from which this quote is taken argues that, because we spend so much of our 
time debating issues about the c lassics that are unresolvabie in any direct 
sense, we often do not build the theoretical structures suggested by the 
c lass i cs . What is largely wasted e f f or t then is not our attention to the 
c lass ics , but the way in v^ich ws attend to them. lb see how this argunent 
was actually presented, see Wagner, 1984: Chapter 2. 
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